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MICHAEL D. REAGEN'S The Managed Economy expresses a recurrent theme
of the present decade's political and economic literature: the need for more
effective public control over the country's economy.' The author expounds at
great length the need for responsible government action to reestablish our
waning political and economic democracy. With the increasing concentration
of power in the nation's giant corporations, business management, insulated
from accountability to the public, is becoming a dangerously irresponsible
center of social control.2 Mr. Reagen strikes at every phase of the business-
man's activity; nothing is immune from his scathing disapproval. This attack
is then used by the author to justify the revolutionary changes in our tradi-
tional political system of checks and balances that he proposes in his final
chapter. 3 There, among other observations, Reagen notes that the present in-
terrelationships between Congress and the President are ineffectual and re-
quire radical change.4 The stakes are too great for our nation to be saddled
with a never-ending stalemate, resulting from partisan haranguing and de-
bate. Thus the need exists, the author feels, for a shift of power to the Presi-
dency in all vital areas, which would give power in those areas approximate
to that which the Executive now enjoys in national security matters.5 Congress
would then possess the veto power and would sit principally as a reviewing
body for the President's policy decisions. 6
Unfortunately the author merely whets the reader's appetite with these con-
cluding suggestions for change in our existing political system. Rather than
deal in depth with these problems and proposals the author spends the bulk of
his words attacking American big business in a way which seems to bear little
relevance to the political issues raised in his last chapter. It almost seems as if
the author changed the objectives of his book while in the process of writing;
indeed, his efforts might better have been concentrated in political, rather than
corporate, matters. For in justifying what he deems to be the needed changes
in the political power structure and processes of policy formulation, Reagen
presents a distorted and quite gratuitous account of the evils of corporate
power.
Throughout the work he asserts the ineffectiveness of the anti-trust laws in
restraining concentrations of corporate power. In fact he depicts all the giants
of American industry as possessors of the most blatant monopoly powers.
1. Preface, p. vii.
2. Section IL "The Public Role of the Private Corporation," pp. 73-156.




1312 [Vol. 73 : 1303
REVIEWS
The present extent of oligopoly... already means the existence of a quite
sizable degree of market power, that is, power to determine how many of
what kind of product will be made available at what price.
7
From this Reagen deduces that oligopolistic firms have complete control over
their prices and over their profits as well." Evidence of this unrestrained
monopoly power is derived from what Reagen calls the "burgeoning phenom-
enon of profit 'targets' in large corporations."9 The inferential gap that links
profit targets with monopoly powers is indeed a substantial one. The fact that
a corporation establishes an objective for return-on-investment evidences what
Reagen should consider desirable planning rather than a monopoly power over
the market. In fact the example used by the author refutes his very point. He
states that General Motors' target rate is 15-20 per cent; yet in the years
1948-55 its rate of return averaged 25 per cent.1' General Motors could
establish any target it wished, but its rate of return was ultimately still de-
pendent on its market performance, albeit a most successful performance in
the post-World War II period. Reagen's reliance on the profit target as evi-
dence of the monopoly power of the oligopolistic firm thus seems highly un-
warranted.
Other evils of corporate power which Mr. Reagen finds are also the result
of fallacious reasoning. He seeks to illustrate the disappearance of the market
system with an example of vertical integration by an automobile producer with
wholly-owned steel mill and iron ore subsidiaries."1 Because of vertical owner-
ship, Reagen contends, the parent need not bargain through the market for its
supplies; rather, the producer sets the prices it is to pay for its subsidiaries'
supplies.' 2 But this illustration is no evidence of the vertically integrated firm's
insulation from the market system. For when the auto producer uses its own
subsidiary's steel in the production of finished products it is absorbing a cost
for that material equal to what could have been obtained for the steel had it
been sold to another manufacturer of automobiles. The cost, measured by the
market system, equals the price which other purchasers would pay for the
same material.
To ameliorate these purported evils of market power the author has few
concrete suggestions other than his plea for greater governmental control
through presidential power. He does mention some additional possibilities
without discussing any in depth. For instance, he toys with the idea of pro-
viding national charters for the two hundred largest corporations; the federal
government could then use the charters to control the scope of corporate
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ernment would have to substitute its judgment for that of the corporate man-
agers in every significant decision - a substitution which not only seems anti-
pathetic to a free and pluralistic society but also one which is of dubious value
in an economy in which corporate competition attracts the bulk of managerial
expertise. The states long ago realized the futility of such an inflexible ap-
proach. Reagen would also break down concentrations of corporate power
through rules of per se illegality for conglomerate mergers 14 and the dismem-
berment of all corporations that obtain twenty per cent market control over
any single product.15 No suggestions are offered as to a solution for the often
inscrutable problem of defining the relevant product market. Nor does Mr.
Reagen mention the loss in efficiencies that would result from this series of
proposals. Failing to recognize that the anti-trust laws are committed to the
goal of enhancing competition so as to pass cost savings to the consumer, Mr.
Reagen proposes increasing the number of firms in a market without inquiry
as to the effect on competitive efficiencies and resultant costs to consumers.
Certainly the author cannot be singled out for criticism in this area, however,
for this same sort of reasoning has been responsible for much of the muddled
rhetoric in leading anti-trust opinions.16
The reader of The Managed Economy may also find a lack of objectivity in
the author's summary attack on the internal decisions of powerful corporate
managers - especially in his discussion of compensation of management.
17
Although it is indisputable that many corporate managers are overpaid by any
set of standards, it is still largely true that executive compensation reflects the
competitive activity in the market for managerial talent. In an atmosphere of
arm's-length bargaining, the price a corporation is willing to pay for an ex-
ecutive - whether it include deferred compensation, stock option, or share of
profits - reflects the estimated value of that individual to the corporation as
determined by officers and directors. It is to the stock option method of com-
pensation that Reagen points for particular censure.' 8 Admittedly many as-
pects of the stock option phenomenon are open to attack - particularly in the
realm of taxation - but the aspect focused upon by the author is clearly not
one of these. Reagen feels that when an option is exercised at a price below
the market the corporation is injured in being deprived of the larger sum
realizable by selling the shares publicly.19 Yet as long as the corporation can
still issue additional shares at the market price it does not sustain any in-
14. P. 240.
15. Ibid. Reagen does make a distinction between primary and secondary markets,
but his relevant percentage remains 20%.
16. For an interesting and most critical account of the trend of anti-trust doctrines





1314 [Vol. 73 :1303
REVIEWS
jury. The option, quite naturally, may have a positive or negative effect on
shareholders' interests, depending upon the size of the option and of the spread
between market and option prices, and upon the way in which the market
judges the relative merits and detriments of the option and its recipient, but
the corporate entity is in no way injured when capital is added to the corporate
resources at less than the market price per share.
20
Mr. Reagen also vigorously objects to the right of management to determine
the allocation of after-tax profits. 21 Such profits "belong" to the stockholders
who should allocate their investment returns as they wish. This contention
seems totally to ignore both the need for corporate expansion and the impact
of the tax laws. And once again, management dividend policy is subject to
market scrutiny. If investors find the policy of a given firm unfavorable they
will be reluctant to invest their resources with that firm's management. As a
result, the management either must alter its policy or face the elimination of
a market for its corporate securities.
Throughout his work Mr. Reagen shows great concern for the economic
impact of major corporate decisions. He advances the presence of this impact
as justification for an increasing governmental role in economic planning, a
thesis which he supports by illustration of the cyclical effect of corporate de-
cisions-.2 2 National Widget Company, invests $6 million per year to meet in-
creased demand. In a year of national recession National Widget acts in its
best interests by eliminating new investment in light of anticipated lessening
of demand. From the corporate viewpoint, National has acted rationally; from
the viewpoint of the national economy it has compounded an already deteri-
orating situation. This model clearly demonstrates the need for governmental
action to assure and stabilize desirable economic growth. Such a thesis should
hardly prove shocking to any student of American economic history; since the
Great Depression none but the die-hard Spencerians have seriously advocated
total governmental non-interference. Yet in agreeing with Mr. Reagen's hope
for an increasing sophistication in government economic activity one need not
adopt his pessimistic outlook on the exercise of corporate power. Except in the
true monopoly situation - and hopefully the anti-trust laws will rid the econ-
omy of these - corporate managers are always accountable to the public
through the market place, which is still the most automatic and effective check
on corporate activities. There corporations are judged by their ability to earn
profits. It is this impetus to limit its activities to energetic profit seeking that
allows government planning to be most effective because it allows government
20. Commentators and judges alike have haggled endlessly on this controversial issue.
The court decisions reflect a wide disparity in reasoning. See, e.g., Bodell v. General Gas
& Elec. Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 119, 132 AtI. 442 (1926). And for more recent discussion of
the same problem, see Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.
1960); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Kremer v.
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to predict corporate activity with maximum assurance. Only when the posses-
sors of corporate power are encouraged to weigh non-profit considerations do
government's predictive tasks become difficult and its subsequent counterac-
tive policies become ineffective.23
J. D. M.
23. For a particularly relevant comment on this thesis, see Rostow, To Whom atid
for What Ends is Corporate Management Responsible?, in MASON (ED.), THE CORPORA-
ION IN MODm SocIETy 46, 69-73 (1960).
